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SUMMARY
The euro crisis was fuelled by the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk,
coupled with cross-border ﬂight-to-safety capital ﬂows. European Safe Bonds
(ESBies), a euro area-wide safe asset without joint liability, would help to resolve
these problems. We make three contributions. First, numerical simulations show
that ESBies with a subordination level of 30% would be as safe as German bunds
and would increase safe asset supply. Second, a model shows how, when and why
the two features of ESBies – diversiﬁcation and seniority – can weaken the diabolic
loop and its diffusion across countries. Third, we propose how to create ESBies,
starting with limited issuance by public or private-sector entities.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the euro in 1999 was a landmark in the European integration process.
Since 2009, however, the euro area has been roiled by financial crisis, with heightened
sovereign default risk, a weakened banking sector, and a stagnating macroeconomy.
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Why did this happen? Among many factors, the euro area lacked institutional features
necessary for the success of a monetary union, including emergency funding for sover-
eigns and common banking supervision and resolution (Brunnermeier et al., 2016).
Some of these deficiencies have since been addressed, but one crucial feature remains
missing. The euro area does not supply a union-wide safe asset, i.e. one that yields the
same pay-off at any point in time and state of the world (Section 2). By storing value in
safe assets, rather than the risky debt of the nation-state in which they reside, banks would
weaken the diabolic loop between their solvency and that of their domestic government.
In a cross-border currency area, union-wide safe assets ensure that flight-to-safety capital
flows occur across assets (i.e. from risky to risk-free assets) rather than countries.
To fill this gap, Brunnermeier et al. (2011) propose Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities
(SBBSs), which constitute senior and junior claims on a diversified portfolio of euro area
central government (‘sovereign’) bonds (Section 3). SBBSs are politically feasible as they
entail no joint liability among sovereigns, in contrast to most other proposals.1
Governments remain responsible for servicing their own debt, which trades at a market
price, exerting discipline on borrowing decisions. One government could default on its
obligations without others bearing any bail-out responsibility and without holders of the
senior claim bearing any losses.
We advocate Brunnermeier et al.’s proposal in three ways. First, in Section 4, simula-
tions measure SBBSs’ risk. With a subordination level of 30%, the senior claim has an
expected loss rate similar to that of German bunds. This motivates the moniker of
‘European Safe Bonds’ (or ‘ESBies’) to refer to the senior claim. In addition, ESBies
would increase the supply of safe assets relative to the status quo. The corresponding
junior claim — which we refer to as ‘European Junior Bonds’ (or ‘EJBies’) — would be
attractive investments, thanks to their embedded leverage and expected loss rates similar
to those of riskier euro area sovereign bonds.
These simulations take default probabilities as given, yet probabilities should change
endogenously in response to banks’ safer portfolios. To capture this idea, in Section 5,
1 Other proposals are summarized by Claessens et al. (2012) and Tumpel-Gugerell (2014). Common issu-
ance of eurobonds, contemplated by the European Commission (2011) and Ubide (2015), implies joint
liability. The blue–red proposal of Von Weizsacker and Delpla (2010) entails joint liability for the first
60% of a sovereign’s debt stock (relative to GDP). The ‘eurobills’ proposal of Philippon and Hellwig
(2011) involves joint issuance of short-maturity bills of up to 10% of a country’s GDP. Even the
German Council of Economic Experts’ (2012) proposal for a ‘European Redemption Pact’ involves
some degree of joint liability, albeit with strict conditionality, and without creating a union-wide safe
asset. Hild et al. (2014) envisage a security similar to ESBies, namely a synthetic security backed by a
GDP-weighted portfolio of sovereign bonds, but with partial joint liability among nation-states. To our
knowledge, the only proposal for a pooled security that does not engender joint liability is that of Beck
et al. (2011), whose ‘synthetic eurobond’ is comparable to ESBies without tranching. Our simulations in
Section 4 and our model in Section 5 show that tranching is critical to ESBies’ safety.
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we extend a workhorse model of the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk
developed by Brunnermeier et al. (2016). We show that the diabolic loop is less likely to
arise if banks hold adequately subordinated ESBies rather than domestic government
debt or a diversified portfolio with no tranching. ESBies are thus a ‘positive sum game’.
Third, in Sections 6 and 7, we investigate how to implement ESBies. At present, their
creation is stymied by regulation, which would penalize them relative to direct holdings
of sovereign bonds. To remove this regulatory roadblock, policy-makers should ensure a
fair treatment of ESBies, and provide incentives for greater diversification of banks’ and
insurers’ government debt portfolios. Policy should also play a standard-setting role,
helping financial institutions to overcome coordination failures in creating a new market.
An official Handbook should define ESBies’ subordination level and underlying portfolio
composition, as well as the institution(s) licensed to issue them. Following these prepara-
tory steps, issuance should start at a small scale, allowing investors to digest the new
securities, before the market for ESBies is deepened.
2. CRISIS WITHOUTAUNION-WIDE SAFE ASSET
Modern financial systems rely on safe assets. They lubricate financial transactions, which
often entail a contractual requirement to post collateral (Giovannini, 2013), and so allow
market participants to transfer liquidity or market risk without creating counterparty
credit risk. To comply with liquidity regulations, banks need to hold safe assets to meet
their funding needs in a stress scenario (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2013). And central banks conduct monetary policy by exchanging money, whether cur-
rency or reserves, for quasi-money in the form of safe assets with longer maturities
(Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2016).
A safe asset is liquid, maintains value during crises, and is denominated in a currency
with stable purchasing power. Relative to investors’ demand for safe assets, there is
scarce global supply of securities that possess all three characteristics (Caballero, 2010).
The most widely held safe asset, US Treasury bills and bonds, earns a large ‘safe haven’
premium of 0.7% per year on average (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012).
Acute safe asset scarcity can have negative macroeconomic effects by increasing risk pre-
mia, pushing the economy into a ‘safety trap’ (Caballero et al., 2016).
The euro area does not supply a safe asset on par with the United States, despite en-
compassing a similarly large economy and developed financial markets. Instead, euro area
governments issue debt with heterogeneous risk and liquidity characteristics. Five euro
area nation-states – Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Luxembourg – are
rated triple-A by either Moody’s or S&P. In 2015, the face value of central government
debt securities issued by these nation-states stood at e1.9tn (18% of euro area GDP). By
contrast, outstanding central government debt securities issued by the United States had a
face value of $11.7tn in 2015 (65% of US GDP). The relative scarcity and asymmetric
supply of euro-denominated safe assets creates two problems, which we explain next.
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2.1. Diabolic loop
In calculating capital requirements, bank regulators assign a zero risk weight to banks’
claims on any European Union (EU) Member State (Subsection 6.1). This provision
facilitates banks’ proclivity for home bias (European Systemic Risk Board, 2015).
As Figure 1 shows, this home bias became particularly pronounced among banks in vul-
nerable countries during the crisis, reflecting distorted incentives (Battistini et al., 2014).
Near-insolvent banks attempted to earn ‘carry’ on interest rate spreads in a gamble for
resurrection (Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Acharya et al., 2016; Buch et al., 2016).
Also, publicly-owned and recently bailed-out banks increased their holdings of domestic
government debt significantly more than other banks (Becker and Ivashina, 2014; De
Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016; Ongena et al., 2016).
Home bias forges an adverse link between sovereign risk and bank risk. A shock to
the market value of sovereign bonds causes banks’ book and market equity value to fall,
and activates two propagation channels. First, the increase in bank leverage raises the
probability that the home sovereign will bail out the bank’s bondholders, insofar as the
bank is deemed too important (or politically connected) to fail (Acharya et al., 2014;
Gaballo and Zetlin-Jones, 2016). Second, in response to the increase in leverage, banks
shed assets in an attempt to return towards their target leverage ratio (Adrian and Shin,
2014). This includes cuts in loans to firms and households (Altavilla et al., 2016); the at-
tendant credit crunch reduces economic activity. These two channels – through govern-
ment bail-out expectations and the real economy – exacerbate sovereign risk, completing
what we refer to as the ‘diabolic loop’ owing to its adverse consequences (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Mean of banks’ domestic sovereign bond holdings as a percentage of
their total holdings
Notes: Figure plots the mean of euro area banks’ holdings of their own sovereign’s debt as a proportion of their
total sovereign debt holdings. Banks are split into two subsamples: those resident in ‘non-vulnerable’ countries
(i.e. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands) and those in
‘vulnerable’ countries (i.e. Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Slovenia, Greece).
Sources: ECB; Altavilla et al. (2016).
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This loop was the quintessential characteristic of the euro area sovereign debt cri-
sis. In some countries (e.g. Ireland and Spain), widespread bank insolvencies endan-
gered the sustainability of sovereign debt dynamics. In other countries – Greece,
Italy, Portugal and Belgium – long-run public debt accumulation and slow growth
generated sovereign debt dynamics that threatened banks’ solvency. In both cases,
domestic governments’ guarantees became less credible, and the interaction of sov-
ereign risk and bank risk amplified the crisis after 2009. To weaken the diabolic
loop, the euro area needs a safe asset that banks can hold without being exposed to
domestic sovereign risk.
2.2. Flight to safety
The euro area features a strong asymmetry in the provision of safe assets: Germany sup-
plies two-thirds of top-rated euro-denominated central government debt securities. This
asymmetry exacerbates the swings of cross-border capital flows during financial crises.
During the 2003–2007 boom, capital flowed from non-vulnerable to vulnerable
countries, attracted by the perceived relative abundance of investment opportunities
and the absence of foreign exchange risk. These boom-era capital flows fuelled credit ex-
pansion in vulnerable countries, raising local asset prices and compressing sovereign
bond spreads. Effectively, investors treated all euro area nation-states’ bonds as safe.
In the presence of financial frictions, however, the credit expansion in vulnerable coun-
tries led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Productivity slumped because
extra credit was disproportionately allocated to low-value-added sectors (Reis, 2013), es-
pecially real estate and other non-tradable sectors (Benigno and Fornaro, 2014).
Figure 2. The sovereign-bank diabolic loop
Notes: Figure depicts the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk. The ﬁrst loop operates via a bail-out
channel: the reduction in banks’ solvency raises the probability of a bail-out, increasing sovereign risk and lower-
ing bond prices. The second loop operates via the real economy: the reduction in banks’ solvency owing to the
fall in sovereign bond prices prompts them to cut lending – reducing real activity, lowering tax revenues and
increasing sovereign risk further.
Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2011).
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After 2009, short-term capital flows from non-vulnerable to vulnerable countries re-
versed, as investors sought safety above all else (Lane, 2013). Without a union-wide safe
asset, non-vulnerable sovereigns’ debt partially satisfied investors’ newfound demand for
safety. The capital flow reversal depressed non-vulnerable nation-states’ borrowing costs
below the level justified by fundamentals – and, in proportion, elevated vulnerable sov-
ereigns’ borrowing costs. Consequently, capital in search of safety flowed from high-risk
to low-risk countries in a self-fulfilling manner.
With ESBies, capital flights to safety would take place from high-risk to low-risk
European assets rather than from vulnerable to non-vulnerable countries. As a result,
the safe haven premium enjoyed during crises by the euro area’s pre-eminent safe asset
– German bunds – would dissipate. This dissipation is desirable: Germany’s safe haven
premium is the corollary of expectations-driven runs on sovereign debt elsewhere in the
euro area. From a German point of view, the loss of the safe haven premium would be
compensated in two ways. First, ESBies would reduce the probability of crises, as we
show in Section 5. Crises are particularly damaging for Germany’s export-oriented
economy, regardless of the safe haven premium. Second, conditional on being in a crisis,
bail-out requirements would be smaller if banks’ portfolios were invested in ESBies, as
they would be less exposed to sovereign risk. This benefits fiscally strong countries that
might otherwise contribute disproportionately to a bail-out.
3. DESIGN OF ESBies
ESBies are the senior claim on a diversified portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds. To cre-
ate them, a public or private special purpose entity (or entities) purchases a diversified
portfolio of euro area sovereign bonds,2 weighted according to a moving average of euro
area countries’ GDPs or contributions to European Central Bank (ECB) capital.3 For in-
vestors, a well-defined, slow-moving weighting scheme has the benefit of transparency and
predictability. More importantly, the use of GDP or ECB capital key weights ensures that
there are no perverse incentives for governments in terms of debt issuance: the special pur-
pose entity or entities would buy only a certain fraction of each country’s outstanding cen-
tral government debt securities at their market price. Countries with large debt stocks
would need to place proportionally more of their obligations in the open market.4
2 We define sovereign bonds with reference to central government debt securities. The portfolio, how-
ever, could in principle comprise a broader category of public debt, such as general government debt.
3 We consider only the inclusion of nation-states in the euro area. The concept of ESBies, however,
could be extended to other jurisdictional units. Bauer et al. (2008), for example, propose an asset-
backed securitization of emerging market debt. In this case, exchange rate risk could be managed by
increasing the subordination level, using foreign exchange derivatives, or requiring nation-states to
issue a fraction of their debt in a common currency.
4 Market discipline would be enhanced by a provision that excludes from the underlying portfolio any country
that has been shut out of primary markets, as we explain in Subsection 6.2.3. This ensures that market access
problems in one country do not spill over to other countries by making the issuance of EJBies more difficult.
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To finance this diversified portfolio, the entity (or entities) issues two types of
Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (SBBSs): ESBies and European Junior Bonds
(EJBies). ESBies are senior to EJBies. Together, they would be fully collateralized by the
underlying portfolio, such that the combined face value of ESBies and EJBies equals the
sum of the face values of the national sovereign bonds against which ESBies and EJBies
are issued.5 The resulting balance sheet of the SBBS issuer is shown in Figure 3. This
simple balance sheet underscores how the securities are fundamentally different from
other securitized assets such as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). SBBSs are backed
by standardized assets (sovereign bonds) that are traded on liquid secondary markets; by
contrast, MBSs are backed by heterogeneous mortgages that have no liquid secondary
market and for which prices are not directly observable. This makes MBSs opaque and
complex, allowing issuers to milk their reputation by engaging in lax screening (Keys
et al., 2010), and credit rating agencies to assign noisy and biased ratings (Efing and
Hau, 2015). By virtue of their simplicity, SBBSs preclude such reputation-milking.
Both tranching and diversification are key to ESBies’ safety. Losses arising from sover-
eign defaults would first be borne by holders of the junior bond; only if they exceed the
subordination level, such that EJBies are entirely wiped out, would ESBies begin to take
any losses. In Section 4, we show that a subordination level of 30% – such that the jun-
ior bond represents 30%, and the senior bond 70%, of the underlying face value –
would ensure that ESBies have an expected loss rate similar to that of German bunds.
As such, ESBies would be standard low-risk fixed income securities; EJBies would be
more akin to government equity with a state-contingent pay-off structure. The next sec-
tions explore the quantitative properties of ESBies and EJBies, their effect on the dia-
bolic loop, and their practical implementation.
Figure 3. Balance sheet of an SBBS securitization vehicle
Notes: Figure shows the balance sheet of an SBBS securitization vehicle, whereby its diversiﬁed portfolio of sover-
eign bonds is ﬁnanced by the issuance of two securities, with ESBies senior to EJBies.
5 Brunnermeier et al. (2011) moot further protection for the senior bond in the form of a state-
guaranteed ‘credit enhancement’. However, as we show in Section 4, credit enhancement is unneces-
sary to ensure the safety of the senior bond. Thus, ESBies need not encompass any public guarantee.
SAFE BONDS 183
4. QUANTITATIVE PROPERTIES OF ESBies
This section addresses three related questions.Would ESBies be as safe as top-rated sover-
eign bonds?Would their supply be adequate for banks to use them as a safe store of value?
And would there be enough demand for EJBies? The simulation results lead us to answer
‘yes’ to all three questions. First, with an appropriate subordination level, ESBies can be
designed such that they are as safe as German sovereign bonds. Second, ESBies could
substantially increase the supply of safe assets relative to the status quo, without deviating
from the fundamental principle that they should be backed by the sovereign bonds of all
euro area Member States (with the exception of those which have lost primary market
access, as we explain in Subsection 6.2.3). Third, in our benchmark calibration, EJBies
have an expected loss rate comparable to those of vulnerable euro area sovereign bonds.
We obtain these results by comparing four security designs: (i) the status quo, in which
sovereign bonds are neither pooled across nation-states nor tranched for safety; (ii) na-
tional tranching, where each sovereign bond is tranched into a senior and junior compo-
nent at a given subordination level; (iii) pure pooling, where sovereign bonds are pooled in
a single portfolio, with weights equal to countries’ relative GDP over 2010–2014; and
(iv) pooling and tranching, where the pooled portfolio is tranched into a senior component
(ESBies) and a junior component (EJBies) at a given subordination level.
We begin with a simple calculation to illustrate ESBies’ robustness to extreme default
scenarios (Subsection 4.1). We then undertake a more rigorous analysis by way of nu-
merical simulations (Subsection 4.2). Under a benchmark calibration of the simulation
model, ESBies with a subordination level of 30% are as safe as German bunds
(Subsection 4.3). To check the sensitivity of these results to parameter uncertainty, which
is a perennial concern when measuring the risk of securitizations (Antoniades and
Tarashev, 2014), we subject the simulation model to an adverse calibration in Subsection
4.4 and a battery of alternative parameterizations in a separate Web Appendix.
These simulations take the distribution of default and loss-given-default (LGD) rates
as given, and therefore, ignore general equilibrium effects. Yet by expanding the volume
of safe assets that may be held by banks, ESBies endogenously reduce the number of
states in which the diabolic loop can operate. Because this mechanism is hard to quan-
tify empirically, Section 5 presents a theoretical model that captures it. For now, though,
by neglecting this general equilibrium effect, our simulations are conservative in the
sense that they understate the risk reduction that ESBies can achieve.
4.1. Illustrative default scenarios
Sovereign defaults are rare events, implying considerable uncertainty regarding true
LGD rates. For robustness, we subject sovereign bonds to three different LGD rates per
country i: lgd1i ; lgd2i and lgd3i . The values of lgd1i , which represent the most severe
losses, are shown in Table 1; the values of lgd2i are 80% those of lgd1i ; and lgd3i values
are 50% lower.
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We apply these LGD rates to the hypothetical default(s) of euro area nation-states. In
Panel A of Figure 4, these defaults are assumed to be uncorrelated, country-specific
events. In the worst case, the idiosyncratic default of Italy – which has a portfolio weight
of 16.52% and an lgd1 of 80% – implies losses of 13.2% for a diversified portfolio of
euro area sovereign bonds. For a portfolio consisting only of 30%-thick EJBies, the loss
would be 13:2% 30% ¼ 44%. ESBies are fully protected in this scenario.
In Panel B of Figure 4, defaults are correlated across countries. At any given point
on the vertical axis, all countries at and below that point are assumed to be in de-
fault, with loss rates given by their respective lgd1i; lgd2i or lgd3i . For example, the
‘ES’ point on the vertical axis refers to simultaneous defaults by Spain, Italy,
Portugal, Cyprus and Greece: when this happens, the underlying portfolio incurs
losses of 25.4%, 20.3% or 12.7% under assumptions of lgd1i ; lgd2i and lgd3i , re-
spectively. With lgd1i , ESBies are robust to simultaneous defaults by Estonia and all
nation-states rated below it; with lgd2i , they are robust to defaults by France and all
Table 1. Simulation inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rating C. Bonds/GDP G. Debt/GDP Weight pd1 pd2 pd3 lgd1
Germany 1 39 71 28.16 5 0.5 0 40
The Netherlands 1 51 65 6.61 10 1 0 40
Luxembourg 1 12 22 0.18 10 1 0 40
Austria 1.5 67 86 3.21 15 2 0 45
Finland 1.5 48 64 2.02 15 2 0 45
France 3 73 96 21.25 25 3 0.05 60
Belgium 3.5 84 106 3.93 30 4 0.1 62.5
Estonia 4.5 0 10 0.03 35 5 0.1 67.5
Slovakia 5 45 52 0.66 35 6 0.1 70
Ireland 6.5 49 79 1.80 40 6 0.12 75
Latvia 7 25 36 0.17 50 10 0.3 75
Lithuania 7 34 43 0.25 50 10 0.3 75
Malta 7.5 56 61 0.07 55 11 0.4 78
Slovenia 9 71 83 0.37 60 15 0.4 80
Spain 9 79 100 10.77 60 15 0.4 80
Italy 9.5 110 132 16.52 65 18 0.5 80
Portugal 12 72 129 1.77 70 30 2.5 85
Cyprus 13.5 35 108 0.19 75 40 10 87.5
Greece 19 40 177 2.01 95 75 45 95
Average 4.6 66 93 31.30 8.07 1.12 59.47
Notes: This table reports the inputs used in the numerical simulations described in Section 4. Nation-states are
ordered in terms of their sovereign credit ratings as of December 2015. Letter grades are converted into a numer-
ical score (1 is AAA, 19 is CCC-) and averaged across S&P and Moody’s (column 1). Column 2 refers to the face
value of outstanding central government debt securities as a percentage of GDP in Q4 2015 (Eurostat code:
gov_10q_ggdebt). Column 3 refers to the face value of consolidated general government gross debt (following the
Maastricht criteria) as a percentage of GDP in 2015 (Eurostat codes: teina225 and naida_10_gdp). Column 4
refers to the percentage weight of each sovereign in the pooled euro area portfolio, corresponding to nation-states’
relative GDPs (with the constraint that the pooled portfolio cannot include more than 100% of nation-states’ out-
standing debt). Columns 5–7 describe the ﬁve-year default probabilities (in percentage) in states 1, 2 and 3, re-
spectively. Column 8 describes the ﬁve-year LGD rates (in percentage) in state 1; in state 2, LGD rates are 80%
of those in state 1 and in state 3 they are 50% of those in state 1.
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nation-states rated below it; with lgd3i , they survive all defaults (i.e. ESBies incur no
losses even if all nation-states default).
These illustrative calculations are informative regarding the severity of shocks that would
be necessary for ESBies to begin to take any losses. Their usefulness is limited, however, as
they consider a set of default events without specifying their probabilities. Therefore, in the
next subsection, we subject ESBies and EJBies to an ex ante risk assessment in a simulation
model, which takes thousands of draws from default probability distributions.
4.2. Simulating multiple default scenarios
To further assess the quantitative properties of ESBies and EJBies, we design a two-level
hierarchical simulation model. In the first level, we simulate 2,000 five-year periods, in
each of which the aggregate economic state can take one of three values:
State 1: A severe recession occurs; default and LGD rates are very high for all nation-states, and
particularly for those with worse credit ratings. In this state, the expected default rate over five
years is listed in column 5 of Table 1; LGD rates are shown in column 8.
State 2: A mild recession occurs; default and LGD rates are elevated in all nation-states. Expected five-
year default rates are given in column 6 of Table 1; expected LGD rates are 80% of those in state 1.
State 3: The economy expands; default risk is low for most nation-states (column 7 of Table 1);
LGD rates are 50% of those in state 1.
A B
Figure 4. Illustrative default scenarios
Notes: Figure plots total losses incurred by a portfolio comprising euro area sovereign bonds with weights given in
Table 1. Panel A plots total losses on this portfolio following uncorrelated, country-speciﬁc default events (under
the respective LGD of lgd1i ; lgd2i and lgd3i , shown in different shades of grey, and given in Table 1). Panel B
plots total losses following simultaneous cross-country defaults: at any given point on the vertical axis, all countries
at and below that point are assumed to be in default.
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The aggregate random variable determines that the euro area economy is in the
good state 70% of the time and in one of the two recessionary states 30% of the time.
This 70:30 split between expansions and recessions accords with NBER data on the US
business cycle spanning 1854–2010. Using CEPR’s business cycle dating for the euro
area on the shorter sample of 1974–2014, the economy was in a recession in 20% of the
years, so our assumption of 70:30 is appropriately pessimistic. Of the 30% recessionary
states, similarly long time-series data gathered by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
Schularick and Taylor (2012) suggest that about one-sixth are severe. We match these
historical patterns by assuming that mild recessions occur 25% of the time and severe re-
cessions occur 5% of the time.
The model’s second hierarchical level concerns sovereign default. Within each five-
year period, conditional on the aggregate state in that period (drawn in the first level of
the model), we take 5,000 draws of the sovereigns’ stochastic default processes. The ran-
dom variable that determines whether a given sovereign defaults, and which can be
interpreted as the ‘sunspot’ in the theoretical model of Section 5, is assumed to have a
fat-tailed distribution (Student’s t with four degrees of freedom), making defaults far
more likely than under a normal distribution. In each state of the economy, nation-
states’ default probabilities increase with their numerical credit score (higher scores indi-
cate worse ratings). With 2,000 five-year periods and 5,000 draws within each period,
our simulation uses a total of 10 million draws.
4.3. Benchmark calibration of the numerical simulation
The purpose of our simulations is to compare the four cases of security design along two
dimensions: five-year expected loss rates (calculated as average loss rates over the simula-
tions of the default process), and the ‘safe asset multiplier’ (namely the units of safe assets
produced by the securitization per unit of safe asset in the underlying portfolio).
In the benchmark calibration of the model, we select the parameters such that
average default rates are consistent with market prices. According to calculations by
Deutsche Bank, which infers default probabilities from credit default swap (CDS)
spreads by assuming a constant LGD rate of 40%, annual default probabilities were
0.20% for Germany and 0.30% for the Netherlands in December 2015; by compari-
son, our benchmark calibration of the model calculates 0.07 and 0.15%, respectively.
This difference can be explained by the counterparty credit risk and liquidity premia
that inflate CDS spreads, particularly for highly rated reference entities. For other
countries, our model calculates precisely the same default probabilities as those
implied by CDS spreads in December 2015. This cross-check with CDS spreads
allows us to establish nation-states’ relative riskiness; in Subsection 4.4 and the Web
Appendix, we subject default rates to various stress tests.
Moreover, the model is calibrated so that LGD rates are broadly consistent with his-
torical data on recoveries following sovereign defaults. According to Moody’s data on
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Table 2. Correlations between nation-states’ default probabilities
Panel A: Benchmark calibration
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Panel B: Adverse calibration
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Notes: Matrices show the correlations between nation-states’ probabilities of default in the benchmark (Panel A,
described in Subsection 4.3) and adverse (Panel B, described in Subsection 4.4) calibrations of the simulation
model. Correlations are much higher in the adverse calibration owing to the additional contagion assumptions.
Higher (lower) correlations are shown in darker (lighter) gray.
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sovereign defaults over 1983–2010, most of which were by emerging or developing
economies, issuer-weighted LGD rates were 47% when measured by the post-default
versus pre-distress trading price, and 33% based on the present value of cash flows
received as a result of the distressed exchange compared with those initially promised.
On a value-weighted basis, average LGD rates were 69% and 64%, respectively. This
calibration is subject to further robustness checks in the Web Appendix, where we envis-
age a uniform 15% increase in LGD rates.
These calibrations deliver the default and LGD rates reported in Table 1, and the
cross-country correlations in default probabilities shown in Panel A of Table 2. Later, in
Subsection 4.4, we impose additional contagion assumptions that lead to the aggravated
correlations shown in Panel B of Table 2. Even more severe contagion assumptions are
modelled in the Web Appendix.
Figure 6. Senior bonds’ ﬁve-year expected loss rates by subordination level
Notes: Figure shows the expected loss rates of the senior tranche of national sovereign bonds versus that of the
pooled euro area security. When the subordination level is 0%, there is no tranching: national sovereign bonds
correspond to the status quo, and the pooled security corresponds to pure pooling (as in Figure 5). When the subor-
dination level is greater than 0%, national sovereign bonds correspond to national tranching, and the pooled port-
folio corresponds to ESBies. For brevity, this ﬁgure displays only the largest four nation-states; data for others are
shown in Table 3.
Figure 5. Untranched bonds’ ﬁve-year expected loss rates
Notes: Figure shows the expected loss rates of national sovereign bonds versus that of the pooled euro area security
without tranching. The vertical axis is truncated at 15% for presentational purposes; the expected loss rate on
Greek sovereign bonds is 34.16%. The data presented in this ﬁgure correspond to those reported in Table 3.
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4.3.1. Effects of pooling and tranching on safety.We begin by comparing pure pool-
ing with the status quo. The pooled security’s five-year expected loss rate of 2.79% is given
by the horizontal line in Figure 5. This expected loss rate is slightly higher than that of
Irish sovereign bonds (2.38%); it is, therefore, a long way from German, Dutch,
Luxembourgish, Austrian and Finnish bonds, which all have an expected loss rate lower
than 0.5% in the status quo.
With national tranching, the decline in expected loss rates as a function of the subordin-
ation level is minimal: no additional nation-state clears the 0.5% safety hurdle at 10%
subordination (Figure 6 and Table 3). ESBies, by comparison, benefit more from
tranching, as they also entail diversification. The expected loss rate of the pooled security
(2.79%) falls to 0.91% with tranching at 10% subordination.
The subordination level is, therefore, a key policy variable: it affects the senior bond’s
safety and the volume of safe assets that is generated. Our simulations point to 30% as a
reasonable middle ground between minimizing expected loss rates and maximizing safe
Table 3. Senior bonds’ ﬁve-year expected loss rates in the benchmark calibra-
tion (%)
Subordination 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Germany 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
The Netherlands 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Luxembourg 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Austria 0.50 0.42 0.32 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.50 0.42 0.32 0.19 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 1.09 0.99 0.86 0.70 0.49 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belgium 1.42 1.29 1.14 0.94 0.69 0.34 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Estonia 1.83 1.70 1.53 1.32 1.05 0.67 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
Slovakia 2.05 1.91 1.74 1.52 1.23 0.83 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 2.38 2.25 2.09 1.88 1.61 1.24 0.68 0.30 0.00 0.00
Latvia 3.42 3.22 2.97 2.65 2.24 1.68 0.85 0.38 0.00 0.00
Lithuania 3.41 3.21 2.96 2.64 2.23 1.68 0.85 0.38 0.00 0.00
Malta 3.92 3.72 3.46 3.13 2.70 2.14 1.30 0.67 0.00 0.00
Slovenia 4.90 4.65 4.35 3.96 3.45 2.78 1.77 0.91 0.00 0.00
Spain 4.90 4.66 4.35 3.97 3.45 2.78 1.77 0.91 0.00 0.00
Italy 5.63 5.34 4.99 4.53 3.93 3.14 1.97 0.98 0.00 0.00
Portugal 8.97 8.52 7.95 7.23 6.26 5.16 3.62 1.59 0.80 0.00
Cyprus 13.58 12.75 11.70 10.35 8.56 6.90 5.06 1.99 1.28 0.00
Greece 34.16 31.80 28.85 25.06 20.01 14.47 11.92 7.67 3.24 2.16
Pooled 2.79
ESBies 0.91 0.33 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Table shows the senior bonds’ ﬁve-year expected loss rates (in percentage) in the benchmark calibration
described in Subsection 4.3. It corresponds to the summary data presented in Figures 5 and 6. The ﬁrst row of
the table refers to the subordination level, which deﬁnes the size of the junior bond. The 0% subordination refers
to the special case of no tranching. The remaining rows refer to the bonds of nation-states and, in the penultimate
row, the GDP-weighted securitization of the 19 euro area sovereign bonds (without tranching), and in the ﬁnal
row ESBies (i.e. the senior tranche of the pooled security). Numbers in black denote ﬁve-year expected loss rates
below 0.5%, which is the threshold below which we deem bonds to be safe, while numbers in grey denote loss
rates above this safety threshold.
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asset supply: at this level, ESBies are slightly safer than the untranched German bund,
and – as we shall see in the next subsection – the safe asset multiplier is a healthy 1.74.
4.3.2. Supply of safe assets. For tractability, we classify an asset as safe if its five-year
expected loss rate is 0.5% or less, so that it would correspond approximately to a triple-
A credit rating. Figure 7 plots on the vertical axis the volume of safe assets generated by
the different security designs. The horizontal axis measures the volume of safe assets
used in the securitization. The slopes of the lines represent the securities’ internal multi-
plier: namely, the units of safe assets produced by the securitization per unit of safe asset
in the underlying portfolio.
In our base case of 30% subordination, ESBies have an internal multiplier of 1.74.
This contrasts with national tranching, which can cause a net destruction of safe assets be-
cause the subordinated component of safe nation-states’ debt may be rendered unsafe.
Only at 40% subordination does the senior bond of an additional nation-state (namely
France) become safe. This explains the non-monotonicity of the multiplier as a function
of the uniform subordination level.
To prevent the net destruction of safe assets by tranching already safe nation-states’
debt, one could ‘optimize’ national tranching by minimizing the subordination level per
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Figure 7. Supply of safe assets
Notes: Figure plots the volume of safe assets used in the securitization (horizontal axis) against those generated by
the securitization (vertical axis). The solid lines refer to ﬁxed subordination levels of 2 ½20; 30; 40%; those in
black refer to ESBies, while the solid grey lines refer to tranched national bonds. Solid lines above the 45 line
imply net generation of safe assets; lines below it imply net destruction of safe assets. The dashed vertical grey line
intercepts the horizontal axis at e1.9tn, which represents the total outstanding face value of safe central govern-
ment debt securities in 2015.
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country, such that each nation-state’s senior bond has an expected loss rate just below
the 0.5% threshold. For Germany, this minimum is 0%; for France, 40%; and for Italy,
77%. Overall, optimized national tranching generates a multiplier of 1.75, similar to that of
ESBies with 30% subordination. The design of ESBies, however, could also be opti-
mized so that its expected loss rate is just below 0.5%: this occurs at a subordination level
of 16%, at which ESBies have an internal multiplier of 2.1 – significantly higher than
that under optimal national tranching. Moreover, ESBies are more robust to parameter
uncertainty than nationally tranched bonds, since for the latter a smaller-than-expected
recovery from a default would result in a haircut for the supposedly safe senior bond.
4.3.3. The attractiveness of EJBies. One might worry that the safety of ESBies comes
at the expense of very risky EJBies that no investor would want to buy. This worry is
fundamentally misguided: if investors hold sovereign bonds, then they will also hold syn-
thetic securities backed by these bonds.
In fact, EJBies will be attractive to investors seeking to leverage their exposure to sov-
ereign risk more cheaply than by using on-balance sheet leverage. This is because the
first-loss piece comes with embedded leverage, the advantage of which can be illustrated
with a simple example. Take the case of a hedge fund seeking exposure to a diversified
portfolio of sovereign bonds. Imagine that the hedge fund wishes to enhance its return
using leverage. It has two options. It could buy a pool of sovereign bonds on margin; the
prime broker would set the cost of this margin funding at the interest rate of the hedge
fund’s external funding. Alternatively, the hedge fund could buy EJBies, in which lever-
age is already embedded. In this case, the leverage is implicitly financed at the safe inter-
est rate of ESBies, rather than at the hedge fund’s marginal rate of external funding,
which is likely to be much higher. The hedge fund can, therefore, lever its portfolio
more cheaply by using the leverage embedded in EJBies.
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of EJBies borne by embedded leverage, one might
still wish to gauge the riskiness of EJBies and, therefore, the price at which investors
would be willing to buy them. To see this, we analyse the expected loss rates of EJBies,
and compare them with those of existing sovereign bonds. Expected five-year loss rates
of the junior bond decrease monotonically as the subordination level increases (Figure 8
and Table 4), since a larger junior bond is available to bear the same quantity of losses.
As with the senior bond, the interaction of diversification and tranching means that
EJBies’ expected loss rates fall significantly as the subordination level increases – much
more than for the junior tranches of national sovereign bonds. At 10%, EJBies’ expected
loss rate is high, at 19.7%, because losses are absorbed by a small junior bond. But in
our base case of 30% subordination, EJBies have a five-year expected loss rate of 9.1%.
By comparison, the bonds of the four lowest rated euro area vnation-states – Italy,
Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece – have a weighted average expected loss rate of 9.3%.
One might wonder whether markets have sufficient capacity to absorb a large quan-
tity of EJBies with risk characteristics similar to those of the four lowest-rated euro area
nation-states. With an underlying portfolio of e1tn, for example, EJBies with 30%
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subordination would have a face value of e0.3tn. At the same time, they would supplant
e0.21tn of Italian, Portuguese, Cypriot and Greek debt, and an additional e0.11tn of
Spanish debt, so that the overall supply of such moderately risky securities would not
change much. Moreover, a hypothetical e0.3tn market for EJBies should be compared
Figure 8. Junior bonds’ ﬁve-year expected loss rates by subordination level
Notes: Figure shows the expected loss rates of the junior tranche of national sovereign bonds versus that of the
pooled euro area security. The data presented in this ﬁgure correspond to those reported in Table 4.
Table 4. Junior bonds’ ﬁve-year expected loss rates in the benchmark calibration
(%)
Subordination 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Germany 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15
The Netherlands 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.54 0.45 0.38 0.34 0.30
Luxembourg 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.67 0.54 0.45 0.38 0.33 0.30
Austria 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.17 1.00 0.84 0.72 0.63 0.56
Finland 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.17 1.00 0.84 0.72 0.63 0.56
France 1.99 1.99 1.99 1.98 1.94 1.81 1.55 1.36 1.21
Belgium 2.52 2.52 2.52 2.50 2.49 2.30 2.02 1.77 1.57
Estonia 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.01 3.00 2.85 2.62 2.29 2.03
Slovakia 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.27 3.16 2.93 2.57 2.28
Ireland 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.51 3.50 3.26 2.97 2.64
Latvia 5.21 5.21 5.21 5.19 5.16 5.13 4.72 4.28 3.80
Lithuania 5.19 5.19 5.19 5.17 5.14 5.11 4.70 4.26 3.79
Malta 5.76 5.76 5.76 5.75 5.70 5.66 5.31 4.90 4.36
Slovenia 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.02 6.98 6.60 6.12 5.44
Spain 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.07 7.02 6.98 6.61 6.12 5.44
Italy 8.18 8.18 8.18 8.18 8.12 8.07 7.62 7.04 6.25
Portugal 13.03 13.03 13.03 13.03 12.78 12.53 12.13 11.01 9.96
Cyprus 21.11 21.11 21.11 21.11 20.26 19.26 18.55 16.66 15.09
Greece 55.39 55.39 55.39 55.39 53.85 48.99 45.51 41.89 37.72
EJBies 19.70 12.63 9.10 6.96 5.58 4.65 3.99 3.49 3.10
Notes: Table shows the junior bonds’ ﬁve-year expected loss rates (in percentage) in the benchmark calibration
described in Subsection 4.3. It corresponds to the summary data presented in Figure 8. The ﬁrst row of the table
refers to the subordination level, which deﬁnes the size of the junior bond. The remaining rows refer to the bonds
of nation-states and, in the ﬁnal row, EJBies (i.e. the junior tranche of the pooled security). Numbers in black de-
note ﬁve-year expected loss rates below 7%, which represents the approximate threshold below which bonds
would be rated investment grade, while numbers in grey denote expected loss rates above this threshold.
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with the global high-yield market: non-euro area nation-states rated BB or BBB had out-
standing debt of e4.1tn in 2012. EJBies would appeal to investors in such high-yield
securities, as they would deliver high expected returns owing to their embedded leverage.
4.3.4. Sub-tranching EJBies to cater to different investors. In principle, the EJB
component could be sub-tranched or repackaged in ways that make them more desir-
able to investors with different risk appetites. For instance, it is possible to sub-tranche
the junior bond into a first-loss ‘equity’ piece and a mezzanine bond, each catering to a
different clientele, as envisaged by Corsetti et al. (2016). Risk-averse investors, such as in-
surance companies and pension funds, would be attracted to the mezzanine bond; others
specialized in high-yield debt, such as hedge funds, would prefer the first-loss piece.
We consider three sub-tranching types: a 50/50 split, whereby the equity piece com-
prises 15%, and the mezzanine bond 15%, of the underlying face value; a two-thirds/
one-third split, whereby the equity piece comprises 20% and the mezzanine bond 10%;
and a third case in which the equity piece comprises 25% and the mezzanine bond 5%.
With the 50/50 split, the mezzanine bond has an expected loss rate of 2.68%. This is
slightly lower than that of Latvian sovereign bonds and slightly higher than Irish sover-
eign bonds, and maps to a credit rating of approximately A (i.e. ranked 6 on a 1–22 rat-
ing scale), which is firmly investment grade. The equity piece has an expected loss rate
of 15.52%, which is slightly higher than that of Cypriot sovereign bonds, and would be
assigned a credit rating of Bþ (i.e. ranked 14 on a 1–22 rating scale), making it a ‘specu-
lative’ high-yield security.
As the size of the equity piece increases, such that the mezzanine bond is protected by
a larger first-loss piece, the expected loss rate of the mezzanine bond falls. With a 10%
mezzanine bond and a 20% equity piece, the expected loss rate of the mezzanine falls to
2.40%, which is similar to that of Irish sovereign bonds and maps to a credit rating of
approximately Aþ (i.e. ranked 5 on a 1–22 rating scale). With a 5% mezzanine bond and
a 25% equity piece, the expected loss rate of the mezzanine falls to 1.54%, which is similar
to that of Belgian bonds and maps to a rating of AA (i.e. ranked 3 on a 1–22 rating scale).
Similarly, the expected loss rate of the equity piece decreases as its size increases, since
the same quantum of losses is spread over a larger tranche. With a 5%/25% split be-
tween mezzanine and equity, the equity piece has an expected loss rate of 10.61%,
which is slightly below that of Portuguese sovereign bonds and below investment grade.
At this level of riskiness, the equity piece would be an attractive investment proposition
for hedge funds and other specialized investors in high-yield debt.
4.4. Adverse calibration of the numerical simulation
In the benchmark calibration of the simulation, commonality in defaults comes from
credit ratings conditional on the aggregate state, namely whether the euro area economy
is in the catastrophic state 1, bad state 2 or good state 3. To consider a more adverse
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calibration, we build in further cross-country dependence. This provides a pessimistic
robustness check and allows us to evaluate how ESBies would perform in adverse condi-
tions relative to other security designs. We make four additional contagion assumptions,
imposed sequentially in the following order:
1. Whenever there is a German default, others default with 50% probability.
2. Whenever there is a French default, other nation-states default with 40% probabil-
ity, except the ﬁve highest rated nation-states, which default with 10% probability.
3. Whenever there is an Italian default, the ﬁve highest rated nation-states default
with 5% probability; the next three nation-states (France, Belgium and Estonia) de-
fault with 10% probability; and the other nation-states default with 40% probabil-
ity – unless any of these nation-states had defaulted at step 1 or 2.
4. Whenever there is a Spanish default, the ﬁve highest rated nation-states default
with 5% probability; the next three nation-states default with 10% probability; and
the other nation-states default with 40% probability – unless any of these nation-
states had defaulted at step 1, 2 or 3.6
These contagion assumptions substantially increase cross-country default correlations,
as is evident in Panel B (relative to Panel A) of Table 2. The first principal component of
defaults now explains 42% of covariation in default rates, compared with 29% in the
benchmark calibration, and the first three principal components account for 64% of the
covariation compared with 57% before. Table 5 shows the conditional default probabil-
ities, which given the way we calibrated the adverse simulation have the feature that
euro area nation-states are very sensitive to the default of Germany, France, Italy or
Spain.
Five-year expected loss rates for status quo sovereign bonds are much higher than in
the benchmark calibration (Table 6). Now, only untranched German sovereign bonds
are safe, so that status quo safe asset supply is e1.1tn, compared with e1.9tn in the bench-
mark calibration. France’s expected loss rate increases from 1.09% in the benchmark to
1.94% in the adverse calibration; Spain’s from 4.90% to 6.80%; and Italy’s from 5.63%
to 7.22%.
6 These four additional contagion assumptions are applied sequentially in the order in which they are
described. For example, if there is a German default at step 1, all other nation-states default with a
probability of 50%. If France then defaults at step 2 – which if Germany defaults happens with 50%
probability, but if Germany does not default happens with probability pd1 ¼ 25%, pd2 ¼ 3% or pd3
¼ 0.05% – the nation-states with a credit rating superior to France’s default with probability 10%, if
they had not already defaulted, while those with an inferior rating default with probability 40%. After
this step 2, we add the default events to those from the step 1. So if a nation-state had not defaulted
after step 1, but defaults in step 2 after France’s default, then it has defaulted after steps 1 and 2 taken
together.
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Only pooling or only tranching does not increase safe asset supply. The expected loss
rate of the pooled security rises from 2.79% in the benchmark calibration to 3.84%: pure
pooling, therefore, generates no safe assets. With national tranching, the five highest rated
nation-states’ senior bonds are safe with 30% subordination, so the internal multiplier is
1.1. One must increase the subordination level to 50% for French senior bonds to qual-
ify, at which point the internal multiplier is 1.45.
Again, ESBies make a significant difference. In our base case of 30% subordination,
the expected loss rate is 0.42%, compared with 0.09% in the benchmark calibration.
Therefore, even in this adverse calibration of our simulation model, ESBies are slightly
safer than German bunds. Moreover, at 2.48, ESBies’ internal multiplier is even higher
in the adverse than in the benchmark calibration.
ESBies’ safety is ensured by the junior bond, which naturally is riskier in the adverse
calibration than in the benchmark one. With 30% subordination, EJBies’ five-year ex-
pected loss rate is 11.81%, compared with 9.10% in the benchmark calibration.
Table 5. Conditional default probabilities (%)
Benchmark calibration Adverse calibration
conditional on a default by: conditional on a default by:
Germany France Spain Italy Germany France Spain Italy
Germany 100 3 2 2 100 18 12 11
The Netherlands 7 6 4 4 26 19 14 14
Luxembourg 7 6 4 4 25 20 14 14
Austria 10 9 7 7 28 22 16 16
Finland 10 9 7 7 28 22 16 16
France 17 100 11 11 46 100 28 27
Belgium 20 19 14 13 44 45 31 30
Estonia 24 22 16 16 46 47 32 32
Slovakia 24 23 17 16 70 69 62 61
Ireland 28 25 19 18 70 70 63 62
Latvia 35 33 25 24 72 72 65 64
Lithuania 35 33 25 24 72 72 65 64
Malta 39 36 28 27 73 73 66 65
Slovenia 44 41 32 31 75 74 68 67
Spain 43 40 100 31 81 77 100 67
Italy 47 44 35 100 84 79 72 100
Portugal 56 52 44 43 80 79 74 73
Cyprus 62 59 52 51 82 82 77 77
Greece 88 86 82 81 93 93 91 91
Notes: Table shows the default probabilities of euro area nation-states (given in the rows of the table) conditional
on the default of Germany, France, Spain or Italy (given in the columns). These conditional default probabilities
are shown for the benchmark calibration (Subsection 4.3) and the adverse calibration (Subsection 4.4). In the
benchmark calibration, correlations between nation-states’ default probabilities arise entirely out of the state of
the euro area economy and similarity in credit ratings. Default probabilities are otherwise independent.
Conditional default probabilities are shown for the benchmark calibration for comparison with those of the ad-
verse calibration, in which there are four additional contagion assumptions governing the correlation matrix of
default probabilities. Owing to these additional contagion assumptions, default probabilities conditional on the
default of Germany, France, Spain or Italy increase monotonically in the adverse calibration relative to the
benchmark calibration of the simulation model. If Italy defaults, for example, Spain then has a probability of de-
fault of 67% in the adverse calibration, up from 31% in the benchmark calibration. This underscores the severity
of the adverse calibration of the simulation model.
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Nevertheless, EJBies could still be sub-tranched to create an investment grade 15%-thick
mezzanine bond with an expected loss rate of 6.38%, protected by a 15%-thick equity
piece with an expected loss rate of 17.24%.
5. A MODEL OF THE DIABOLIC LOOP
The simulations presented in the previous section are based on fixed estimates of sover-
eign default probabilities and correlations. Probabilities, however, would change if euro
area banks were to reduce the home bias of their sovereign portfolios, either by holding
a diversified portfolio of bonds or by holding ESBies. Since there is no historical case of
such portfolio rebalancing, we turn to theoretical analysis to understand how default
probabilities and their correlations would change with different compositions of banks’
sovereign portfolios.
The structure of banks’ sovereign portfolios affects sovereign default probabilities for
the reasons described in Section 2. Insofar as banks hold fewer domestic sovereign
bonds, home-grown sovereign risk is less likely to destabilize them, which in turn miti-
gates concerns about sovereigns’ solvency. However, if banks hold more foreign
Table 6. Five-year expected loss rates in the adverse calibration (%)
Subordination 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Tranche S J S J S J S J S J
Germany 0.50 0.40 1.43 0.27 1.43 0.11 1.42 0.00 1.26 0.00 1.01
The Netherlands 0.69 0.55 1.94 0.38 1.94 0.16 1.93 0.00 1.73 0.00 1.38
Luxembourg 0.69 0.55 1.94 0.38 1.94 0.16 1.93 0.00 1.73 0.00 1.38
Austria 0.96 0.80 2.41 0.60 2.41 0.35 2.40 0.09 2.27 0.00 1.93
Finland 0.96 0.80 2.41 0.60 2.41 0.35 2.40 0.09 2.27 0.00 1.93
France 1.94 1.75 3.66 1.51 3.66 1.20 3.66 0.81 3.63 0.33 3.54
Belgium 2.64 2.40 4.80 2.10 4.80 1.71 4.80 1.22 4.76 0.54 4.74
Estonia 3.10 2.87 5.23 2.57 5.23 2.19 5.23 1.70 5.20 1.03 5.18
Slovakia 5.58 5.16 9.30 4.65 9.30 3.98 9.30 3.13 9.25 1.97 9.19
Ireland 6.05 5.68 9.40 5.21 9.40 4.62 9.40 3.83 9.37 2.80 9.30
Latvia 6.81 6.38 10.66 5.85 10.66 5.16 10.66 4.26 10.62 3.09 10.53
Lithuania 6.80 6.37 10.64 5.84 10.64 5.15 10.64 4.26 10.61 3.08 10.52
Malta 7.32 6.91 11.04 6.39 11.04 5.73 11.04 4.85 11.03 3.72 10.92
Slovenia 8.17 7.74 12.05 7.20 12.05 6.51 12.05 5.59 12.05 4.41 11.94
Spain 6.80 6.45 9.94 6.02 9.94 5.46 9.94 4.71 9.94 3.75 9.86
Italy 7.22 6.85 10.58 6.38 10.58 5.78 10.58 4.98 10.58 3.96 10.49
Portugal 11.80 11.21 17.12 10.47 17.12 9.52 17.12 8.25 17.12 6.78 16.82
Cyprus 16.07 15.12 24.61 13.93 24.61 12.41 24.61 10.37 24.61 8.41 23.73
Greece 35.19 32.79 56.77 29.79 56.77 25.94 56.77 20.80 56.77 15.15 55.23
Pooled 3.84
ESBies/EJBies 2.02 20.24 1.02 15.13 0.42 11.81 0.15 9.38 0.03 7.64
Notes: Table shows the ﬁve-year expected loss rates (in percentage) in the adverse calibration described in
Subsection 4.4. The ﬁrst row refers to the subordination level, which deﬁnes the size of the junior bond. The se-
cond row refers to the tranche type; ‘S’ (in black) denotes the senior bond and ‘J’ (in grey) the junior bond. The
cell referring to 0% subordination is blank, since there is no tranching in this case: all bonds are pari passu. The re-
maining rows refer to the bonds of nation-states and, in the ﬁnal row, the pooled security, which represents a
GDP-weighted securitization of the 19 euro area nation-states’ sovereign bonds.
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sovereign bonds, they become more exposed to the solvency risk of foreign sovereigns,
so that shocks may spread across borders via the balance sheets of banks.
We analyse these issues through the lens of a model of the diabolic loop.
Brunnermeier et al. (2016) focus on the polar cases in which banks hold only domestic
sovereign debt, an equally weighted portfolio of domestic and foreign sovereign debt, or
ESBies. We extend their model to a continuum of portfolios, spanning the entire spec-
trum from complete home bias to complete diversification, either via pure pooling or
pooling-cum-tranching (ESBies). This extension is important from a policy perspective
because future prudential regulation is unlikely to induce complete diversification, even
if it reduces the extent of banks’ home bias.
Our analysis uncovers three main results. First, without tranching, international diver-
sification of banks’ sovereign portfolios can be a blessing (if banks are well capitalized) or
a curse (if they are weakly capitalized). Second, ESBies reduce the number of states in
which contagion can occur and expand those in which no diabolic loop can occur.
Third, the extent to which ESBies have this effect depends on their design: greater sub-
ordination enhances the safety of ESBies, as shown numerically in Section 4, and there-
fore reduces the number of states in which the diabolic loop can occur.
5.1. The model
Here, we present the layout of the model and its main results graphically, and leave the
detailed presentation of assumptions and derivations to the Web Appendix.
In the model, there are two countries, each populated by four agents: (i) the govern-
ment, which prefers higher to lower output, as this is associated with greater tax rev-
enue; (ii) dispersed depositors, who run on insolvent banks if the government does not
bail them out, and also pay taxes; (iii) bank equity holders, who hold all of their wealth
in initial bank equity, so that they cannot recapitalize banks subsequently; and (iv) in-
vestors in government bonds, whose beliefs determine the price of sovereign debt.7 The
two countries are identical, so there is no loss of generality in focusing the analysis only
on one of them, which we shall refer to as the domestic country.
Initially, there is a unit-size outstanding supply of zero-coupon domestic sovereign
bonds with face value

S > 0. Domestic banks are endowed with a sovereign bond port-
folio that may include domestic sovereign bonds, a pooled security (comprising domestic
and foreign sovereign bonds in equal weights), or some combination of both. We express
banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign bonds as a fraction a of the total face value

S, so
that the face value of banks’ domestic holdings is a

S. Likewise, we express banks’
7 For simplicity, we assume that all agents are risk-neutral. There is no discounting, so the risk-free inter-
est rate is zero. Short-term deposits yield extra utility compared to long-term government debt due to
their convenience value in performing transactions. This is necessary to justify the demand for bank de-
posits backed by sovereign debt. Otherwise, banks would not need to hold sovereign debt.
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holdings of the pooled security as a fraction b of

S, so that the face value of banks’ hold-
ings of the pooled security is b

S.8 The total face value of banks’ overall sovereign port-
folio is then ðaþ bÞ

S ¼ c

S. Note that b can be interpreted as an indicator of the extent
to which banks’ portfolios are diversified. Beside sovereign debt securities, banks’ assets
include loans L0 to the real economy. Their liabilities are formed by deposits D0 and
equity. The market value of equity depends on the market price of sovereign debt.
Now consider the case in which the pooled security is tranched. Banks hold some
portion of the senior bond (ESBies), while the junior bond (EJBies) is held exclusively by
non-bank investors.9 In this case, we still denote the face value of banks’ holdings of
ESBies by b

S. Hence, the total face value of banks’ overall sovereign portfolio remains
ðaþ bÞ

S ¼ c

S. Note that face value b

S of ESBies is obtained by tranching face value
b

S=f of the pooled security, where f is one minus the subordination level.
The model is composed of four periods (0, 1, 2, 3), shown in Figure 9. At t¼ 0, gov-
ernment bonds in both countries trade at price B0. As stated above, a fraction a of each
country’s bonds is owned by domestic banks, and some may be pooled with the bonds
issued by the foreign country, and possibly tranched, with banks holding a fraction b of
this pooled security. The marked-to-market value of banks’ equity in periods t¼ 0 and
t¼ 1 is equal to a constant E0 plus the capital gains on banks’ sovereign bond holdings
Figure 9. Model timeline
Notes: At t ¼ 1, a sunspot occurs with probability p independently in each country. If it occurs, sovereign bonds
fall in value; when the price drop is sufﬁciently large, banks cannot roll over their lending to the real economy.
At t ¼ 2, the government decides whether to bail out the banks. At t ¼ 3, the government’s surplus is revealed.
The pay-off to bondholders is the size of that surplus minus any reduction in tax revenue (owing to the credit
crunch) at t ¼ 1 and the cost of the bail-out (if it took place) at t ¼ 2.
8 We normalize one unit of the pooled security to face value

S. This is only a normalization: it does not
imply that the total face value of the pooled security is

S. For example, if only a small amount of the
pooled security is created, its face value will be much smaller than that of the outstanding supply of do-
mestic sovereign bonds.
9 In Subsection 6.1.3, we envisage allowing banks to hold EJBies, subject to a punitive risk weight. Our
modelling assumption – that non-banks are the exclusive holders of EJBies – can be interpreted in the
sense that risk weights would be so punitive that banks decide not to hold any EJBies.
SAFE BONDS 199
relative to their book value, i.e. E0 þ ðaþ b2ÞðBt  SÞ þ
b
2 ðBft  SÞ, where we reserve
the notation Bt for the market price of the domestic bond and use B
f
t for the price of the
foreign bond. (The two prices can differ in period 1.) We assume that
0 < E0 < ðaþ bÞ

S; this implies that if the market value of the banks’ entire portfolio
of sovereign debt were to become zero, banks would have negative equity.
At t¼ 1, a sunspot – i.e. a confidence crisis – occurs with probability p independently
in each country. This sunspot carries no fundamental information, and can be inter-
preted as the random variable that governs whether each nation-state defaults in each
draw of the simulation in Section 4. If the sunspot occurs, non-bank investors become
pessimistic about the government’s ability to repay its obligations at t¼ 3. This causes
the price of government bonds at t¼ 1, B1, to drop, reducing the marked-to-market
value of banks’ equity. If this repricing renders the market value of banks’ equity nega-
tive, banks cannot roll-over maturing loans of size wL0, leading to an equal output loss
that reduces the government’s revenue by swL0  0 at t¼ 3. Hence, investors’ pessim-
ism can by itself generate a credit crunch that weakens the government’s fiscal position.
At t¼ 2, if a sunspot occurred at t¼ 1, the government decides whether to bail out
banks before discovering its tax revenue at t¼ 3. If it does not, insolvent banks are un-
able to roll-over a further wL0 of maturing loans, resulting in a deeper credit crunch
and even lower tax revenues at t¼ 3. If instead the government bails out the banks, it
must issue additional government bonds, which are given to the banks as extra assets.
Finally, at date t¼ 3, the government’s fiscal surplus is realized, and all consumption
takes place. If no sunspot occurred, the surplus is just the stochastic variable S, which is
low (

S) with probability p and high (S >

S) with probability1 p. If a sunspot occurred
at t¼ 1 and a bail-out occurred at t¼ 2, the surplus is equal to S, minus the tax loss sw
L0 due to the credit crunch at t¼ 1, minus the cost of recapitalizing the banks (i.e.
E0 þ aðB1 

SÞ). For example, in the case in which banks hold only domestic bonds
(b ¼ 0), they are in need of recapitalization if the reduction in the value of their bonds,
aðB0  B1Þ, is greater than their equity at t¼ 0, E0 þ aðB0 

SÞ, or equivalently if their
equity at t¼ 1, E0 þ aðB1 

SÞ, is negative. The probability that the government de-
faults at t¼ 3 is the probability that the fiscal surplus is lower than

S.
5.2. The diabolic loop in equilibrium
In the absence of pooling or tranching, and under suitable parameter restrictions, there
are two possible equilibria. If investors do not expect the government to bail out domestic
banks, they also expect that the government will repay

S, even with a low realization of
the surplus. As a result, banks will not suffer a capital loss. But if banks’ initial equity is
sufficiently low, a second equilibrium – the diabolic loop – can arise. Investors expect the
government to bail out banks, eroding the value of government bonds at t¼ 1. This trig-
gers the need for bank recapitalization, which – in tandem with the recessionary effect of
the attendant credit crunch – validates investors’ initial bail-out expectation, leading to a
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sovereign default when S ¼

S. The sunspot picks this bad equilibrium with probability p.
A time-inconsistency problem is at the root of this bad equilibrium: if the government
could credibly commit to never bail out banks, the diabolic loop would not arise.
Importantly, the diabolic loop equilibrium can occur if the fraction of domestic sover-
eign debt held by banks exceeds a threshold value relative to banks’ equity. In this case,
if investors become pessimistic due to the sunspot, the sovereign debt repricing will
make banks insolvent, prompting the government to bail them out, which in turn pre-
cipitates sovereign default and justifies the investors’ pessimism. Policy-makers can re-
duce the probability of a diabolic loop, or even exclude it entirely, by increasing bank
equity requirements and reducing the fraction a of domestic sovereign bonds that banks
are permitted to hold. If banks are not well capitalized, however, reducing the fraction a
of domestic sovereign bonds held by banks and increasing the fraction of b of the pooled
security held by banks increases their vulnerability to a foreign sunspot.
This is best understood with graphs; the Web Appendix contains the underlying ana-
lysis. Domestic banks are initially endowed with a fraction a of domestic sovereign bonds
and b of the pooled security. In Figure 10, the parameter E0 that characterizes bank
equity is on the horizontal axis, and the degree of diversification of banks’ sovereign
portfolio, b, is on the vertical axis. The parameter c  aþ b, which characterizes the
overall size of banks’ sovereign bond portfolio, is held constant. Complete home bias
corresponds to b¼ 0; complete diversification (in which domestic banks hold an equal-
weighted portfolio of domestic and foreign sovereign bonds) corresponds to b ¼ c.
Consider first the case of no tranching, shown in Panel A of Figure 10. When E0 ex-
ceeds the critical value cpswL0, banks are so well capitalized that the diabolic loop can-
not occur, even if banks’ sovereign debt portfolios are composed entirely of domestic
debt (i.e. b¼ 0), and regardless of the subordination level. In this case, a sovereign bond
sell-off would be unjustified even following a global sunspot, because banks’ initial equity
is so large that the government could recapitalize them without defaulting. Hence, in
equilibrium no bond repricing would occur at date t¼ 1.
For values of E0 below cpswL0 (but not too low), if banks hold a well-diversified port-
folio of sovereign debt (i.e. with sufficiently high b), a local sunspot – that is, a loss of con-
fidence in the solvency of the home country only – cannot trigger the diabolic loop. In
this diversification region, the repricing of banks’ sovereign portfolios following a local sun-
spot is so limited that they do not become insolvent. The benefits of diversification, how-
ever, are absent in the event of a global sunspot, when a simultaneous diabolic loop in
both countries can still occur, although only with probability p2.
For even lower values of E0 or lower levels of diversification b, there exists the uncorre-
lated diabolic loop region, in which diversification is too limited to bring either benefit or
harm. In this region, a country-specific sunspot will trigger the diabolic loop only in the
country concerned. Hence, the probability of a diabolic loop occurring in the domestic
country being triggered is simply that of a sunspot occurring there, i.e. p.
For even lower E0 or higher b, one enters the contagion region, in which diversification
turns from a blessing into a curse. Here, a country-specific sunspot triggers a global
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diabolic loop: given banks’ weak capitalization and diversified portfolios, a sunspot
in either country brings down the banks and sovereigns in both countries. In this re-
gion, from the perspective of each country, the probability of the diabolic loop being
triggered, i.e. pþ pð1 pÞ, is larger than in the region with uncorrelated diabolic
loops, where the probability is p. In the spirit of Wagner (2010), full diversification
(without tranching) by individual institutions can facilitate contagion across coun-
tries. The policy lesson is that simply increasing banks’ diversification (without
ESBies) may be harmful rather than beneficial if they are poorly capitalized, as it
will increase contagion.
A
B
C
Figure 10. Diabolic loop regions by ESBies’ subordination level
Notes: Figure analyses the case in which there is tranching at no (Panel A), low (Panel B) and high (Panel C) levels
of subordination. As subordination increases, the no diabolic loop region increases, while the other regions shrink. In
the limit, when subordination is very high, the contagion and diversiﬁcation regions disappear.
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5.3. ESBies: shift to a new equilibrium
If banks were instead to use ESBies to diversify their sovereign portfolios, the contagion
region would endogenously shrink compared to the case of no tranching, and the region
in which no diabolic loop can occur would expand at the expense of the diversification
region. Figure 10 shows that the magnitude of these endogenous changes increases as a
function of ESBies’ subordination level. With a higher subordination level, the potential
for a local sunspot triggering a global crisis decreases, and so does its ability to trigger a
local crisis. The intuition for this result is that tranching shifts default risks to junior
bond holders outside of the banking sector. Tranching is thus a positive sum game, as it
reduces the endogenous risk of a diabolic loop. In fact, if subordination were very high,
both the contagion and the diversification regions would vanish. Of course, as we know
from the simulations in Section 4, choosing a very high degree of subordination also re-
duces the supply of ESBies, so it does not come as a free lunch.
The model also sheds light on how to design the shift to a new equilibrium in a way that
does not entail unintended side effects. To see this, imagine that the status quo is character-
ized by very low bank equity (E0) and extreme home bias (b¼ 0). Without ESBies, the
economy may feature uncorrelated diabolic loops: a domestic sunspot triggers a domestic dia-
bolic loop, but not a global one. If policy-makers were to design ESBies with a low subor-
dination level, and banks were to replace the entirety of their sovereign bond portfolios
with ESBies (so that b ¼ c), the new equilibrium would be characterized by contagion, in
which a domestic sunspot in either country triggers a global diabolic loop, insofar as E0 re-
mains very low. This insight carries two policy implications. First, ensure that ESBies are
designed with an adequate subordination level, such that they are truly safe; and second,
impose stringent equity requirements on banks as a complement to the creation of ESBies.
The key insight of the model is that the probability of sovereign defaults and their
cross-country correlation are both affected by the structure of banks’ balance sheets.
Specifically, the probability of default depends on bank capitalization; the diversification
of banks’ sovereign portfolios; and whether diversification takes place with or without
tranching. The diabolic loop equilibrium can be avoided if banks are adequately capital-
ized. At lower levels of bank equity, the possibility of a diabolic loop equilibrium can still
be avoided if banks hold ESBies. Without tranching, diversification can increase the
probability of a diabolic loop by facilitating cross-country contagion. Accordingly, by
introducing ESBies and incentivizing banks to hold them, policy-makers would lower
the probability of sovereign defaults and reduce their cross-country correlation.
6. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR ESBies
Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (SBBSs) are novel assets. In this section, we describe
how to lay the groundwork for their creation. We address five questions: (i) How would
SBBSs integrate with banking regulation? (ii) To what standards should their issuance
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adhere? (iii) Who would issue SBBSs? (iv) How would they interact with sovereign bond
issuance? (v) How would sovereign debt restructuring change in the presence of SBBSs?
6.1. Future reform of banking regulation
Breaking the diabolic loop between sovereign risk and bank risk is a major aim of regu-
latory reform in Europe (Juncker et al., 2015). To date, policy-makers have pursued this
objective by improving the resilience of banks and sovereigns in isolation. Banks are sub-
ject to tighter capital requirements and resolution rules, and sovereigns have improved
their fiscal balance and acquired access to emergency lending facilities. These measures
weaken the diabolic loop, but are not sufficient because they do not diversify banks’ sov-
ereign bond portfolios.
6.1.1. Status quo in EU banking regulation. Banking regulation facilitates home
bias in banks’ sovereign bond portfolios by setting risk weights on exposures to central
governments at zero and by exempting them from large exposure limits (European
Systemic Risk Board, 2015).10 As a result, euro area banks may hold sovereign bonds
without funding them with any equity (as long as the leverage ratio requirement does
not bind). This is logically inconsistent with the Lisbon Treaty’s ‘no-bail-out’ clause,
which is founded on the premise that government debt securities are risky, and in certain
states of the world might be defaulted upon. The absence of any capital charge incentiv-
izes banks to hold risky sovereign bonds rather than other assets of similar riskiness. This
manifests as home bias, particularly when sovereign risk increases: politicians encourage
banks to buy domestic sovereign bonds, and banks’ sovereign bond holdings allow them
to collectively correlate their risks (Farhi and Tirole, 2016).
6.1.2. SBBSs as the complement to regulatory reform. If these regulations are so
damaging, why not assign capital charges to sovereign debt? Without SBBSs, such re-
forms could have unintended consequences. SBBSs, therefore, enable the smooth imple-
mentation of regulatory reform.
To see this, imagine that capital charges were set as a function of risk. Banks would
prefer to satisfy liquidity requirements by holding low-risk sovereign debt. Without
SBBSs, this could generate a regulatory-driven flight to safety from vulnerable to less-
vulnerable nation-states. SBBSs preclude this outcome, as banks could satisfy liquidity
requirements by holding zero risk-weighted ESBies, backed by all nation-states’ bonds.
Another argument against risk-based capital charges rests on their procyclicality.
Raising the risk weight on sovereign debt in a crisis might lead banks to sell bonds,
thereby lowering their price. With a union-wide safe asset there would be no such fire
10 See the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (articles 114, 150 and 400).
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sales: ESBies’ safety ensures that their risk weight would not increase at times of crisis,
and banks would not suffer capital losses when their sovereign encounters difficulties.
Rather than set capital charges as a function of risk, regulators could set them accord-
ing to banks’ concentration in individual sovereign issuers. Banks would be incentivized
to diversify their portfolios, avoiding a regulatory-driven flight to safety. But there are
two drawbacks. First, banks would hold a diversified portfolio without the seniority
offered by tranching. Our analyses in Sections 4 and 5 revealed that such a portfolio
would not be safe; diversification without tranching can even facilitate cross-border
contagion.
The second drawback of concentration-based capital charges is that they might incen-
tivize only partial diversification. In the euro area, the four largest nation-states account
for more than four-fifths of outstanding sovereign debt securities. With a portfolio com-
prised of these four nation-states’ debt securities, the marginal diversification benefit
would be minimal. Small frictions in banks’ ability to operate in other sovereign bond
markets might, therefore, dissuade them from full diversification. Consequently, smaller
nation-states with relatively illiquid sovereign bond markets could be penalized by
concentration-based capital charges. ESBies solve this conundrum, as they represent a
fully diversified and liquid security that banks could buy with minimal transaction costs.
6.1.3. Risk weights on ESBies and EJBies. As part of regulatory reform, policy-mak-
ers should define the treatment of ESBies and EJBies. Under current regulation, they
would both be treated as securitizations, and would, therefore, attract a harsh treatment
relative to that of sovereign debt. This de facto penalization – which extends across the
regulatory landscape, from banks and insurers to other financial institutions – explains
SBBSs’ current non-existence.
To reflect ESBies’ relative safety, and to encourage their issuance, policy-makers
should carve out SBBSs’ regulatory treatment by defining them as quasi-sovereign debt.
EJBies, instead, are risky securities and should be treated as such. If they were not, banks
would be able to arbitrage regulation (by holding EJBies rather than ESBies or sover-
eign bonds) and the diabolic loop would partly remain. Take a bank holding a replicat-
ing portfolio with a share f of ESBies and a share 1 f of EJBies, where 1 f is the
subordination level. If the weighted-average risk weight of directly held sovereign bonds
were X%, and since ESBies’ risk weight is fixed at zero, EJBies’ risk weight must be
X
1f %, so that 0f þ X1f 1 f Þ ¼ X%ð . Importantly, this ‘look-through principle’ takes
into account the tranching structure embedded in the asset-backed security. Similar con-
siderations apply to the regulation of insurers and other financial institutions.
6.2. The SBBS Handbook
Besides regulation, another impediment to the creation of a market for SBBSs is coord-
ination failure, which inhibits issuance by multiple private-sector entities. To address
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these problems, public institutions should play a standard-setting and certification role.
An official SBBS Handbook should set out the key characteristics to which issuers must ad-
here when designing the securities, including their subordination level, the portfolio
weights, and the allocation of the arbitrage margin. A security created by an authorized
SBBS issuer according to these guidelines would then be awarded a ‘license number’
that certifies it as a legitimate SBBS. This process of SBBS certification would ensure
that different issues of SBBSs are homogeneous, and therefore liquid, transparent and
trusted by investors, who understand that the securities do not entail any explicit or im-
plicit joint liability.
6.2.1. Subordination level. As we highlight in Section 4, the choice of the subordin-
ation level embeds a trade-off between ESBies’ safety and size. Our base case subordin-
ation level is 30%, at which ESBies would be as safe as German bunds. The Handbook
should set this level so that it is the same across different issues of SBBSs. This is a trans-
parent and objective characteristic of the securitization.
6.2.2. Portfolio weights and price discovery. To reflect SBBSs’ status as union-
wide assets, portfolio weights should be set according to nation-states’ relative contribu-
tions to the euro area economy. This is strictly better than setting weights according to
nation-states’ outstanding public debt, which would embed a severe moral hazard prob-
lem: by issuing more debt, countries could increase their share in the securitization. In
general, weight recalculations should be infrequent to preserve a high degree of homo-
geneity among outstanding SBBSs. This could be done by calculating a moving average
of countries’ relative GDPs with a window of, say, five years; similarly, one could assign
weights in proportion to national central banks’ shares in the ECB’s capital, which is
slow-moving by design.
One problem with the GDP weighting is that several nation-states in the euro area
have little public debt outstanding relative to their GDP. As of 2015, the nation-state
with the lowest ratio of central government debt to GDP was Estonia (at 0%), followed
by Luxembourg (12%), Latvia (25%), and Lithuania (34%), as shown in Table 1. A sim-
ple solution would be to modify the portfolio weights if SBBSs include all of a nation-
state’s outstanding bonds, with weights on the remaining elements scaled up
proportionally.
The problem with this simple re-weighting scheme is that SBBS issuers would buy all
of the outstanding debt of certain nation-states, so that ordinary price discovery could
no longer take place. But reliable price discovery is a cornerstone of SBBSs. To maintain
price discovery, the SBBS Handbook could adopt the rule followed by the ECB in its pub-
lic sector purchase programme, so that the underlying pool would include only up to
k% of a nation-state’s outstanding bonds, with the SBBS issuer purchasing these bonds
at the market price of the 1 k% still traded on secondary markets. When the k% con-
straint binds, the weights on the remaining elements of the portfolio would be scaled up
proportionally so that the weights sum to 100%.
206 MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL.
With this k% rule, a large market for ESBies and EJBies – in excess of approximately
e1.5tn in total – would require either significant portfolio re-weighting in favour of coun-
tries with larger debt stocks (which is undesirable) or parameterization of k% above the
33% used in the Eurosystem’s public sector purchase programme (which might distort
price discovery). Instead, issuers could be permitted a small amount of discretionary ‘wig-
gle-room’ in their choice of portfolio weights – for example, by underweighting one
country and overweighting the two ‘neighboring’ countries in terms of credit rating, so
that the overall risk of the portfolio stays the same. With multiple private-sector SBBS is-
suers, such wiggle-room would strengthen the process of price discovery on primary mar-
kets. An overpriced sovereign bond, for example, would be underweighted by
competitive SBBS issuers, which seek to assemble SBBS-eligible portfolios at the lowest
price. Such primary market price discovery could permit a higher parameterization of
k%, so that the market for ESBies and EJBies could grow to be very large in steady state.
6.2.3. Exclusion of certain nation-states. SBBSs require price discovery of national
sovereign bonds. When a country loses primary market access, its bonds should not be
included in new issues of SBBSs. We call this the ‘market access criterion’. SBBS issuers
are supposed to purchase sovereign bonds at market prices: purchases cannot happen in
the absence of such prices. Moreover, the inclusion in the underlying portfolio of a country
without market access would make it difficult to place EJBies, potentially giving rise to
contagion. To avoid these spillover effects, newly issued SBBSs should only include central
government bonds with an active secondary market, for which price discovery is ensured.
Excluding a country that loses primary market access from new issues of SBBSs has
the additional advantage of strengthening fiscal discipline, as the penalty from losing
market access would be larger. Hatchondo et al (2017) show a similar incentive effect in
the context of bonds carrying mutual guarantees (‘Eurobonds’). In their model, the
introduction of Eurobonds with a ‘default exclusion’ clause, whereby defaulting coun-
tries are not included in new Eurobond issues, lowers credit spreads in the short run
because countries’ incentives for strategic default decrease.
Besides this market access criterion, the portfolio underlying SBBSs should comprise
all nation-states. Otherwise, arbitrary exclusion would reduce safe asset supply. To see
this, note that any exclusion entails a volume effect, by which the face value of the senior
bond is reduced (holding the subordination level fixed), and a risk effect, which captures
the change in the subordination level required to keep ESBies’ expected loss rate con-
stant. The volume effect always dominates the risk effect, even for risky nation-states.
Consequently, the exclusion of any nation-state unambiguously reduces the supply of
safe assets for given cross-country default correlations.
For instance, compare our benchmark – in which ESBies with 30% subordination
have a safe asset multiplier of 1.74 – with alternative securities that exclude Italy and, in
a separate exercise, Spain. These two countries are chosen arbitrarily for their size and
moderate riskiness; in unreported results, we conduct similar exercises for other coun-
tries, with qualitatively similar findings. Without Italy, ESBies’ safe asset multiplier
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stands at 1.45; Spain’s exclusion puts it at 1.55 (holding the subordination level constant
at 30%). These reductions of 0.29 and 0.19 points (relative to the benchmark multiplier
of 1.74) represent the negative volume effect. In both cases, however, the same level of
safety can be achieved with a lower subordination level: 24% without Italy, and 28%
without Spain. These adjustments lead to positive risk effects of 0.12 and 0.04 points, re-
spectively, resulting in safe asset multipliers of 1.58 without Italy and 1.59 without Spain
– both lower than the benchmark multiplier of 1.74 in which no country is excluded.
The key insight is that there is no trade-off between the union-wide, proportionate
provision of the safe asset and maximization of the volume of safe assets, for fixed correl-
ation structures. This is because each nation-state’s debt contains a component, however
small, that with tranching can be made safe. We conclude that SBBSs should be backed
by all euro area nation-states with primary market access. Only if a nation-state loses
market access should it be excluded from the portfolio.
6.2.4. Liquidity premia and the excess spread. With SBBSs, national sovereign
bonds might feature thinner markets and, therefore, higher liquidity premia (Foucault
et al., 2013). But this drawback would be offset by the creation of highly liquid markets
for ESBies and EJBies. In steady state, the liquidity premium on ESBies and EJBies
would be lower than the weighted-average liquidity premia on the national sovereign
bonds from which they are created. In securitizations, this wedge is called the ‘excess
spread’ or ‘arbitrage margin’.
The accrual and allocation of this arbitrage margin should be defined in the SBBS’
Handbook. One possibility would be to deposit in a residual interest tranche all of the arbi-
trage margin accrued over the life of the securitization. If a default occurs, this residual
interest tranche would cover the first loss, providing additional protection to EJBies. If no
default occurs, the residual interest tranche could be paid to nation-states according to
their weights in the securitization. Alternatively, a more refined disbursement arrange-
ment would compensate nation-states in proportion to the cost that they bear in terms of
higher liquidity premia following the advent of SBBSs. In this way, SBBSs could lead to
a net gain in terms of the overall liquidity premium paid by each nation-state.
6.3. Who would issue SBBSs?
SBBSs can be issued by any entity. The two most likely candidates are either the securi-
tization vehicles of private financial institutions, such as large banks or asset managers,
or a public institution, such as the European Stability Mechanism. This choice is not ex-
clusive: SBBSs could be issued by some combination of private and public entities.
6.3.1. Public versus private. Assigning responsibility for issuing SBBSs to a single public
institution would ensure that the instruments have homogeneous characteristics. The
SBBS’ Handbook would be fully respected, as the public institution would have no incentive
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to deviate from the Handbook’s specifications or engage in market manipulation. Moreover,
a public institution could be depended upon for continuous issuance even during banking
crises, when some private financial institutions might have their functions impaired.
A public SBBS issuer must be independent from political interference with respect to
SBBS’ design. This poses a governance challenge, and perhaps requires new EU legisla-
tion. By contrast, private-sector issuance would not require any such legal change, and
would exploit the fact that many such institutions have pre-existing expertise in securi-
tizations. Importantly, competing private SBBS issuers would strengthen price discovery
in the primary markets for sovereign debt. Private-sector issuers could also compete to
design differently sub-tranched junior securities that are most attractive to investors,
while ensuring that SBBSs are designed in accordance with the Handbook.
In the case of private issuance, a licensing body, which could be an existing public institu-
tion, would authorize prospective issuers. Licences would be given to reputable private fi-
nancial institutions that fulfil some requirements defined in the Handbook, particularly in
terms of the necessary financial expertise and experience. Beyond these basic requirements,
it is important to ensure that the holders of ESBies and EJBies do not face counterparty risk.
6.3.2. Minimizing counterparty risk. Counterparty risk might arise due to risk of de-
fault by the issuer, legal risk, or moral hazard in forming and monitoring the portfolio of
bonds.
To mitigate counterparty credit risk, SBBSs should be made bankruptcy remote from
the issuer’s own balance sheet by using special purpose vehicles to hold the underlying
portfolios of bonds. Thus, in case of default of the issuer, resolution procedures could ex-
tract the SBBS operations of the issuer from the rest of its activities, and carry on servic-
ing and honoring previously issued SBBSs.
To address legal risk, the public licensing body could require SBBS issuers to operate
only in jurisdictions with reliable legal frameworks. The body could even require issu-
ance to take place in a single jurisdiction, so that all SBBSs are subject to the same laws.
Issuers of asset-backed securities are usually subject to two types of counterparty
moral hazard. The first is in selecting the underlying asset pool. This risk is absent in the
case of SBBSs because issuers would have no discretion with respect to asset selection.
The second source of moral hazard is in monitoring the corresponding debtors and
enforcing payments. Because the underlying pool is made of sovereign bonds, the collec-
tion of payments takes minimal effort. Therefore, it is not necessary to require the SBBS
issuer to retain a fraction of the junior bond.
6.4. Dealing with diversity in sovereign bond markets
SBBS issuers could purchase sovereign bonds both on primary and secondary markets.
Activity on secondary markets would be facilitated by European issuers’ tendency to top-up
on-the-run bonds. But primary markets are characterized by cross-country heterogeneity in
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terms of the timing and characteristics of issues. Coordination among debt management of-
fices (DMOs) and some ingenuity by SBBS issuers would overcome this heterogeneity.
6.4.1. Heterogeneity in the timing of issues. Heterogeneity in the timing of issues
creates warehousing risk for the SBBS issuer that must hold sovereign bonds for a short
period of time, subject to market and credit risk, until it assembles the complete portfolio
and places the corresponding ESBies and EJBies. To some extent, warehousing risk is inev-
itable in any securitization activity, and is compensated by the fees and spreads that accrue
to the issuer. In the case of ESBies, it is mitigated by the liquidity of the underlying sover-
eign bonds, easing the process of buying them in secondary markets. Moreover, issuers
could sell ‘to-be-announced’ securities – whereby an issuer sells forward contracts for deliv-
ery of ESBies and EJBies on a pre-agreed date. This reduces warehousing risk by placing
the ESBies and EJBies at the same time as the underlying sovereign bonds are purchased.
Warehousing risk could be significantly reduced if purchases were to happen mostly
at primary issuance. This would be facilitated by coordination among DMOs, as pro-
posed by Giovannini (2000). DMOs would have strong incentives to coordinate, since
SBBS issuers would provide a large and steady demand for national bonds. While this is
not necessary for ESBies to be created, it would simplify matters.
6.4.2. Heterogeneity in bond maturities. Almost all nation-states in the euro area
issue plentiful one-year, five-year and ten-year nominal bonds. Still, in any one month, sev-
eral nation-states might not issue anything in these maturity buckets. This problem could
be partly overcome by the SBBS issuer buying sovereign bonds also in secondary markets.
In addition, DMOs could reopen previous issues of 10-year bonds to help provide a supply
of underlying assets. Insofar as the problem remains, SBBS issuers could engage in time
tranching, on top of the credit tranching that is at the heart of ESBies. Time tranching,
which is standard in the issuance of MBSs, consists of buying bonds of different maturities
and then using their payouts to service synthetic securities of different maturities.
6.4.3. Heterogeneity in other bond characteristics. Euro area sovereign bonds dif-
fer in their coupons, indexing and other characteristics. Again, greater coordination
among DMOs would simplify SBBS issuance. However, nation-states have different
cash-flow requirements and preferences, so some degree of heterogeneity in bond char-
acteristics is unavoidable. This need not prevent the creation of SBBSs, since issuers
have the technical capability to group sovereign bonds with slightly different characteris-
tics. They have faced and overcome greater challenges with private securities.
6.5. Governance during restructuring
SBBSs issuers hold underlying bonds. Yet, having sold all tranches, issuers have no in-
centive to act according to SBBS holders’ interests during a restructuring procedure.
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In private-sector securitizations, a standard solution is to require the issuer to retain a
fraction of the junior bond. This is not necessary, however, as transparency with respect
to the underlying portfolio rules out any scope for manipulation. An alternative is to em-
ploy a special servicer that adheres to a servicing standard and maximizes value on be-
half of all investors. The special servicer is typically controlled by junior investors; post-
crisis arrangements include an operating advisor, appointed by the senior investors, to
balance any bias that the special servicer might have in favour of junior bondholders.
With SBBSs, this model would concentrate considerable power in the hands of a small
number of agents, who would likely be subject to lobbying by special interests.
A better arrangement would be to apply a ‘look-through principle’ to the voting rights
of ESB and EJB holders in proportion to the underlying face value of the securitization.
This broad distribution of voting rights avoids concentrations of power and any bias in
favour of either holding-out or restructuring.
7. CATALYSING THE MARKET FOR ESBies
Reform of the regulatory treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures (Subsection 6.1), an
ESBies’ Handbook (Subsection 6.2), the certification of SBBS issuers (Subsection 6.3) and
coordination of sovereign bond issuance (Subsection 6.4) are necessary preconditions for
an ESBies market. Policy intervention, however, is necessary to kickstart the market for
ESBies. We envision this process taking place in three stages.
7.1. Stage one: incremental growth
At first, SBBS issuance could be limited. Regular issues of, say, e1bn per month would
allow contract details to be refined. Investors could learn about ESBies’ utility as a safe
store of value, and SBBS issuers could acquire information regarding the marginal cost
of issuance, and to charge fees accordingly. Over time, as market participants digest the
new security, the pace of regular issuance could be gradually increased.
7.2. Stage two: deepening the market for ESBies
Limited issuance is useful in the early years, but it cannot elicit the full benefits of
ESBies.11 One option to enlarge the market could be to arrange for a centralized auc-
tion mechanism, whereby bank and non-banks participants submit a price schedule for
sovereign bonds, ESBies and EJBies. After the auction, SBBS issuers would hold the
underlying sovereign bonds, banks would have ESBies and maybe some EJBies, and
non-bank investors would acquire primarily EJBies. While this auction may seem
11 In a model of endogenous safe asset determination, He et al. (2016) show that only sufficiently large is-
suance of a common bond lowers the risk of the remaining fraction of debt.
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involved, it is no more complex than the spectrum auctions of telecommunications
frequencies.
Following the large-scale swap, the market for ESBies would achieve critical mass, in
terms of both liquidity and safe asset supply. Future policy-makers may decide to maintain
market size at such a level, or continue to facilitate its growth. Further growth should not
impede efficient price discovery, which is essential for market discipline.
7.3. Stage three: transition to the new regulatory regime
Once the market for ESBies attains a critical mass, the new banking regulations could be
introduced gradually, allowing banks to comply within a transition period. In this transi-
tion, lower-than-adequate risk weights for national sovereign debt and EJBies would
persist for a short while. Nevertheless, markets may put pressure on banks to engage in
front-running, as happened with capital requirements. Banks may try to move quickly to
meet the future regulatory requirements and use the swap auction to immediately satisfy
the new steady state regulation. Such front-running is acceptable as long as there is a well-
functioning, liquid market for ESBies to facilitate banks’ portfolio rebalancing.
7.4. The role of the European Central Bank
The ECB is a big player in sovereign debt markets. The central bank would benefit
from the presence of ESBies, which provide for a union-wide safe asset with which to
perform monetary policy operations, thereby simplifying risk management decisions.
The ECB could catalyse the market for ESBies in two ways.
First, the ECB could announce that it would accept ESBies as collateral in monetary
policy operations, as suggested by Brunnermeier et al. (2011) and Garicano and Reichlin
(2014). As a general rule, banks should have no reason to hold sovereign bonds instead
of ESBies. The haircut rate at which the ECB would accept ESBies as collateral in mon-
etary policy operations should reflect ESBies’ safety, sending a powerful signal to
markets.
Second, the ECB could use ESBies as its preferred security for open market oper-
ations or quantitative easing. If warranted by its price stability mandate, the ECB could
purchase ESBies without bearing default risk. In the short run, with the national sover-
eign bonds that it already owns and following the rules in the SBBS Handbook, the ECB
could facilitate market creation by selling sovereign bonds to SBBS issuers.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we assess ESBies’ safety via numerical
simulations. With adequate subordination, ESBies would be safe even under adverse
conditions and would increase the supply of euro safe assets. Second, theoretical analysis
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reveals that the sovereign-bank diabolic loop can be weakened insofar as banks hold
ESBies rather than home-biased sovereign debt portfolios. Third, we outline the oper-
ational steps necessary to create SBBSs. After policy-makers change regulation and set
common standards, SBBS issuance should start at a small scale before being deepened.
With these three contributions, we try to advance the policy debate on ESBies.
Clearly, this debate would benefit from further analysis along several dimensions, includ-
ing ESBies’ risk properties under alternative scenarios; appropriate portfolio weights;
and the roles of public- and private-sector entities in SBBS issuance. We hope that these
further analyses will lay the groundwork for making ESBies a reality in financial
markets.
Discussion
Elena Carletti
Bocconi University
The ESBies constitute a union-wide safe asset without joint liability across countries.
Their aim is to ameliorate two important problems currently plaguing the euro area: (i)
lack of safe assets (the Eurozone has only f2.6tn bonds of DE, NL, and LU correspond-
ing to 25% of its GDP, while the US Treasuries amount to 105% of the US GDP); (ii)
presence of a diabolic loop between sovereign and bank risk, which leads to flight
towards bond issued by safe countries in times of crises.
How would ESBies ameliorate these two problems? First, ESBies would duplicate the
supply of assets with a 30% junior tranche. Second, they would reduce the diabolic loop
significantly since, by constituting a union-safe asset, they would entail a flight to safe
assets rather than to safe countries in time of crises.
In essence, the proposal consists of the securitization of euro area government bonds.
The idea is to construct a diversified portfolio of sovereign bonds and split it into a
tranche composed of senior bonds (the so-called ESBies) and a junior tranche composed
of junior bonds (the so-called European Junior Bonds, EJBies). The underlying portfolio
should be formed by bonds of all euro area sovereigns in proportion of national GDP.
Both diversification and tranching are needed to ensure the safety of the senior tranche
with a junior tranche of about 30%. Given these features, ESBies appear to be a ‘win-
win’ security: they are safer than the German bunds and do not entail any
mutualization.
How do the authors prove the benefits of ESBies? They first perform various simula-
tions to prove the quantitative properties of ESBies. In particular, they show that:
i. ESBies would be as safe as the AAA-rated bonds of DE, NL, and LU with 30%
subordination;
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ii. the creation of ESBies would be adequate for banks to use them as a safe store of
value as they would more than double the status quo supply of safe assets; and
iii. there would be enough demand for EJBies given that their expected loss rate
would be comparable to that of vulnerable Euro area countries.
Then, the authors build a theoretical model to show the qualitative properties of
ESBies. The main result is that ESBies can ameliorate the diabolic loop between banks
and sovereigns by reducing the contagion states and increasing those where no loop is
present. Finally, the authors put forth a handbook with instructions as to how implement
the ESBies proposal. These include suggestions on the subordination level, portfolio
weights, issuers, diversity in sovereign bond issuances, transition versus steady state, gov-
ernance during restructuring, etc.
This discussion will centre on the simulation exercises the authors perform and on
some implementation proposals. Let me start from the former. The first comment refers
to the three scenarios used to perform the simulations: severe recession, mild recession,
and expansion. The data used for these scenarios are in line with the US business cycle
in the period 1854–2010. Given the analysis focuses in Europe though, it would be help-
ful to know whether they are also consistent with the European business cycle.
The second comment refers more specifically to the granularity and correlations of
the portfolio underlying ESBies. The crucial aspect in the creation of the CDOs is that
the underlying assets are many and not very correlated. In the case of ESBies, by con-
trast, the underlying portfolio is formed by bonds issued by a limited number of different
countries, which are strongly interconnected both financially and economically. This
implies that the portfolio underlying the ESBies is more likely to exhibit strong correla-
tions and that the benefit of diversification is likely more limited than in the case of
CDOs. One question is how important these aspects are, in particular for the pricing of
ESBies. Although the authors are very careful in calculating the correlations of the
underlying portfolios, the reported numbers (see in Table 2) appear a bit low. Just to
make an example, one could reasonably imagine that a German default would have
much more severe effects on the other countries than shown in the table. Importantly
also, correlations should take account of the effect of the feedback effects between banks
and sovereigns.
A further consideration on the simulation exercises concerns the high concentration
in the underlying portfolio, where German bonds account for approximately 28%,
French bonds for 17%, and Italian and Spanish bonds for about 11%. How important
is this, for the safety of ESBies and again for the correlations among bonds and coun-
tries? Related to this, the safety of ESBies depends crucially on the recovery rates in case
of default, and it is well known, calculating recovery rates for states is much more com-
plicated than for corporates. States are not liquidated even if in default and seizing their
assets can be quite difficult. Thus, how are the recovery rates calculated and what makes
them different across countries? Is it due to the fact that countries have different assets,
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or does it depend on factors such as the quality of the legal system or the quality of the
domestic institutions?
Let me now move to the implementation side of ESBies. As explained above, the pro-
posal is carefully crafted and it contains a large number of implementation details, which
help increase both the attractiveness and the realism of the proposal. Still, the ESBies
are subject to significant political sensitivity, in part because they need to reconcile the
interests of many different parties: the stronger countries, which may fear ESBies as a
mutualization exercise; the weaker countries, which may be asked to accept new regula-
tory requirements in exchange for the creation of ESBies; the debt managers, as they
may perceive ESBies as a threat to the liquidity of their respective domestic sovereign
bond markets and may fear that some coordination in debt issuances will be required
with the creation of ESBies; the market participants as potential issuers and buyers of
ESBies; and the ECB as possible initial coordinator and promoter of the ESBies
issuances.
Given the numerous parties involved and their different interests and objectives, the
creation of ESBies is an economic as well as a political challenge. The question is what
arguments can be made to convince all the involved parties. This is a point where the
authors may want to dig a bit deeper going forward. For example, the paper argues that
stronger countries should appreciate that ESBies reduce the probability of crises and as
well as the need for bailouts in a crisis as banks would be less exposed to sovereigns. But
how attractive is this argument for the stronger countries given that, at least according
to Maastricht, in principle there should just be no bailouts and weaker countries should
first of all implement the necessary reforms to strengthen their economic fundamentals?
And how about the weaker countries? How can they be convinced that the potential
costs of ESBies in terms of new regulatory requirements are needed to improve the
long-term sustainability of both the sovereign and the banking sector? Moving to debt
managers, how can their debt issuances be more coordinated if countries have different
needs? What do we know about the current structure of the sovereign market? How dif-
ferent or similar is it across countries? Finally, the market, how easily is to price ESBies
and EJBies? Certainly, pricing the tranched securities seems to be more difficult than
pricing the underlying assets because of the difficulty in knowing and estimating the cor-
relations among them. Could the pricing be easier if there were more tranches?
Alternatively, could it help to enlarge the underlying portfolio by including the regional
and local government bonds e.g. the debt issued by municipalities?
Two final important implementation issues concern the governing law of the new
securities and the inclusion of defaulted states with non-marketable debt. Most euro
area sovereign debt is issued under domestic law, and particularly so for the larger coun-
tries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain). In which law would the new securities be
issued, and does the governing law of the tranched securities matter for the underlying
assets? The Greek experience has indeed shown that sovereign bonds in domestic law
are subject to an important commitment problem in that the government can retroac-
tively change contracts and default mechanisms. Issuing ESBies and EJSbies under a
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law that ties the hands of the issuers and guarantees legal safety in time of default is cru-
cial for the attractiveness of these securities and thus for generating sufficient market
demand.
A final related issue concerns the rules for defaulted states. Would their bonds be
included in the underlying portfolio even if they are no longer tradable? Including them
would help keeping the representation of the portfolio, while at the same time, however,
reducing the overall marketability and possibly the attractiveness of the tranched
securities.
To conclude, ESBies are a simple but powerful idea. They are gaining political
momentum, but for this it is important to push further their design and analyse in depth
the numerous aspects they entail. In line with this, it would be helpful to run simulations
under more extreme scenarios on the correlations of bonds in the underlying portfolio
and to dig deeper into the calculation of the recovery rates. Further, the creation of
ESBies entails implications for many actors in both the public and private sectors.
Recognizing their different interests and objectives is crucial to ensure the attractiveness
of ESBies and their final implementation. All in all, the ESBies proposal is simple and
attractive, but politically sensitive. Still, it is certainly worth pushing it further.
Panel discussion
In response to Elena Carletti (discussant), Sam Langfield clarified that many of the com-
ments raised regarding the simulations were already addressed to some extent in the
most recent version of the paper that contains several alternative calibrations of the
model e.g. scenarios with higher LGDs, higher PDs, more frequent severe recessions.
Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the authors can test for the robustness of the results
even further and announced that their intention is to put the simulation code online so
that other researchers can themselves examine different setups. He also explained that it
is difficult to have precise estimates of LGD rates given the absence of past observations
on sovereign debt restructurings in Europe (i.e. most occurred in emerging markets).
However, many of the alternative specifications they use were precisely designed to
account for this. In terms of the political economy of the proposal and the conflicting
concerns in different parts of Europe, Sam Langfield recognized that there is no easy
answer but argued that ESBies may be an important step towards decreasing banks’
exposure to domestic sovereign debt, particularly in periphery countries.
Richard Portes first stated that this proposal does not deal with the debt overhang
problem in Europe. He also said that only using AAA-rated debt as a safe asset may not
be appropriate and can end up exaggerating the advantages of ESBies, as described by
the authors. Finally, he claimed that the legal framework is a crucial issue, particularly if
the United Kingdom does leave the EU. On the latter point, Sam Langfield recognized
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the importance of the legal framework and mentioned that the ESBies issuance should
take place in the same jurisdiction in terms of insolvency law.
In their comments, Charles Bean and Richard Portes wondered why the market did
not create such security in the past. Sam Langfield replied that one potential answer is
that this type of securitization is very simple and, as a result, private investors may not
be able to extract rents from it. George De Menil mentioned that this is indeed a very
interesting proposal but still a second-best approach to correct a fundamental flaw in the
construction of the euro. Sam Langfield agreed but stated that given the political con-
straints in relation to the first-best, ESBies may still be an excellent alternative.
Tommaso Monacelli highlighted that the paper focuses too much on the bright side
of securitization, which is in contrast with what we learnt during the recent global finan-
cial crisis. He recommended the authors to do additional simulations that incorporate
stronger correlated shocks and contagion effects. In a related point, Nicola Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln observed that while the simulations treat risk as completely exogenous, sover-
eign default probabilities can endogenously change with the introduction of ESBies.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data are available at Economic Policy online.
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